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During the course of the last century, philosophers and theologians 
became increasingly unsatisfied with classical theism both in respect 
to its internal coherence and its explanatory power. As a consequence, 
alternative concepts of the divine, like panentheism and open theism, 
received much attention. In God, Mind, and Logical Space István 
Aranyosi suggests a further alternative to classical theism that he refers 
to as Logical Pantheism.
Logical Pantheism is based on a number of assumptions, the most 
important ones of which are as follows: First it is based on a particular 
conception of Logical Space, which Aranyosi develops and justifies 
throughout the book. Logical Space, according to Aranyosi, is the sum 
of all logical regions whereas ‘anything ... that can be said in a piece of 
fiction, a story, a play, or a poem, corresponds to a logical region, except ... 
sentences that even individually do not make sense and cannot be given 
any meaningful interpretation in context either’ (p. 16). The category 
of logical regions so conceived of includes ‘possible and impossible 
worlds, possible and impossible partial worlds or situations, as well as 
supra-world entities, like sets and sums of possible worlds’ (p. 13). Since 
Logical Space is furthermore closed under ‘any logical operation on any 
proposition whatsoever’ (p. 13), Aranyosi draws the conclusion that 
Logical Space is the Absolute Everything: ‘Logical Space is the largest 
conceivable space whatsoever, or the Absolute Everything. This is what 
I call the thesis of Logical Totalitarianism.’ (p. 13)
Second, there is no ontologically significant notion of absolute 
existence in contrast to merely possible existence: existence is always 
relative to logical regions: ‘All objects and states of affairs in Logical 
Space have equal claim to being ... To exist means to-exist-relative-to-a-
region-of-logical-space.’ (pp. 27-28) That is to say, each and every entity 
which we can conceive of  – be it Pegasus or a  round square  – exists 
relative to a logical region and nothing that exists at a logical region has 
ontological priority over entities existing at other such regions: ‘Pegasus 
and other winged horses exist in some surroundings (world, situation, 
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or any relevant region of logical space), and they don’t exist in our 
surroundings.’ (p. 25)
Third, Logical Space is ‘beyond existence and nonexistence. It is the 
support of being and non-being’ (p. 121), that is, ‘existence of Logical 
Space is the only absolute notion of existence, and existence of Logical 
Space is necessitated by the plenitude principle of Logical Totalitarianism’ 
(p. 118). Whereas every entity in Logical Space exists relative to its logical 
region, Logical Space itself is considered to be the absolute vessel that 
holds everything within.
Based on the aforementioned assumptions, Logical Pantheism is the 
thesis that God is identical with Logical Space: ‘Logical Pantheism can 
be considered as the most inclusive type of panentheism, because God is 
identified with Logical Space, the Absolute Plenitude as characterized by 
our principle of Logical Totalitarianism.’ (p. 117)
According to Aranyosi, logical pantheism is able to deal with several 
perennial questions and problems found in the philosophy of religion. 
First, the assumption that God is identical with Logical Space turns the 
ontological argument into a sound a priori argument for the existence of 
God because Logical Space is the greatest conceivable entity and exists 
necessarily: ‘To deny that Logical Space exists is itself a proposition in 
Logical Space, so that the denial is only non-contradictory if by “Logical 
Space” one really meant something less than Logical Space. Logical 
Pantheism is the only view that brings about a  successful ontological 
argument, because it accommodates all conceivability intuitions, and 
because Logical Space itself is the only entity that is absolutely necessary.’ 
(p. 117)
Second, logical pantheism is able to deal with Leibniz’ question, ‘Why 
is there something rather than nothing?’ Whereas there is a  riddle of 
existence in respect to standard actualistic ontologies that assume only 
one world to be actual, logical pantheism’s answer to Leibniz’ question 
is straightforward: ‘Why does anything actually exist, then? The answer 
is that Logical Space depicts everything as existing at some region or 
other  ... so necessarily the states of affairs that compose our actuality 
will have to be in Logical Space and exist-at-a-Region-R, so there is no 
mystery why something contingent exists at all.’ (p. 121)
Third, as regards the problem of evil: whereas on standard conceptions 
of classical theism, the problem of evil is perceived to be one of the 
most daunting problems, logical pantheism is able to dissolve the very 
problem by way of turning the existence of evil into a logical consequence 
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of logical pantheism itself. Aranyosi discusses both the existence of evil 
in our world and the existence of possible evil and draws the following 
conclusions: ‘Evil is necessary, and our world has a certain amount of it. 
If God is identical to Logical Space, then there is no problem of evil at 
all. We understand that it is part of the identity of Logical Space that it 
contains all possible amounts of evil. This world is neither the best nor 
the worst, because it is easy to imagine better or worse regions.’ (p. 143) 
Furthermore, ‘there is no modal problem of evil for the logical pantheist, 
for several reasons. One is the obvious reason that Logical Space is itself 
defined by the absolute plenitude, hence, it is no wonder that a world full 
of pain is part of it; it must be part of it, on pain of its not satisfying the 
requirement of plenitude’ (p. 149).
According to Aranyosi, he wrote God, Mind, and Logical Space 
‘without paying too much attention to whether it follows some rules and 
canons of how philosophy is written nowadays and to whether it will 
please or raise to the expectations of his peers. In fact, he thinks it will 
not please them, and he foresees universally negative reviews’ (p. xii). 
As regards the latter point, I have to disappoint Aranyosi: God, Mind, 
and Logical Space is interesting to read and provides many intellectual 
stimuli as it deals with many problems in the philosophy of logic, the 
philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion from the point of view 
of logical pantheism. However, whereas the thesis of Logical Pantheism 
is clearly elaborated and related to the notion of Logical Space, there 
is a problem with the book: the main arguments to vindicate the basic 
assumptions of logical pantheism would have benefitted from a  more 
extensive treatment. As they stand, they often did not convince me 
because they look question begging or ambiguous as regards the use of 
their key terms. In what follows, I only have the space to briefly discuss 
the argument for the thesis of existential relativity.
The assumption that there is no absolute notion of existence which 
we could use in order to demarcate between objects that exist and those 
that do not is one of the most important assumptions in respect to 
Aranyosi’s conception of Logical Space, and consequently in respect to 
his Logical Pantheism: both the answer to Leibniz’ question concerning 
the contingency of the existence of the actual world and the solution 
to the problem of evil essentially depend on existential relativity and 
its consequences, that is, that evil has to exist in Logical Space and that 
every contingent entity exists relative to its own logical region. However, 
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although existential relativity plays such a  crucial role in Aranyosi’s 
system, the argument for it is problematic. It goes as follows:
(1) If existence is absolute, then fictionality is a relevant alternative to 
our belief that we and our surroundings exist.
(2) Fictionality is not an  alternative whatsoever to our and our 
surrounding’s existence.
(3) Hence, existence is not an absolute notion. (pp. 20-21)
The argument is obviously valid, so let us look at some problems: A first 
problem concerns the justification of the first premise. According to 
Aranyosi, the assumption that existence is absolute entails that ‘the 
hypothesis that you and me, and all the others around us are characters 
of a fiction is not provably false’ which ‘is the best sceptical scenario one 
could think of ’ (p. 18). Since globally sceptical scenarios are seldom 
provably false, Aranyosi offers further support for the first premise:
Suppose there is a story in which the character Pegasus and a large number 
of winged horses are depicted as present in the world, and there are also 
two philosophers, call them ‘Wilma Schwine’ and ‘Alexa Seinong’. The 
two philosophers are having a discussion. They agree that ‘Pegasus is one 
of the finest winged horses’ is true, because Pegasus, indeed, a very fine 
winged horse, is part of the two philosophers’ surroundings. They also 
agree that ‘Man o’ War does not exist’ since there are no wingless horses 
in the philosophers’ surrounding, such horses being just characters 
in a  fiction the two philosophers know about. The fiction they know 
about happens to depict us: you and me, and all of our surroundings. If 
existence is absolute, then either we are right in saying that it is Pegasus 
who does not exist and Man o’ War does, or they are right when saying 
that Pegasus exists and Man o’ War does not. However, the symmetry of 
our situation with respect to them (Schwine, Seinong, and so on) and 
their situation with respect to us raises the obvious worry: how do we 
know that we are right, specifically that it is us  ... who exist, and not 
them: Schwine, Seinong, Pegasus, and their surroundings? For all we 
know, we could be the fictional ones. (p. 21)
The biggest problem with this justification of the first premise of 
the argument is that it presupposes the truth of the conclusion of the 
argument for existential relativity and thus begs the question: one 
can only plausible assume that Schwine’s and Seinong’s situation is 
ontologically relevant at all and not just an  interesting thought if one 
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yet already presupposes existential relativity and assumes that it is 
coherent to suppose that in Schwine and Seinong’s world a thoughtful 
conversation is going on. If one does not share this assumption but 
continues to presuppose an ontologically committing notion of absolute 
existence, then the argument for the first premise does not even get off 
the ground because in this case the situation is simply as follows: there 
is a possible world including Schwine and Seinong and winged horses, 
but in contrast to our world, this world does not obtain and only possibly 
exists.
A  second problem with the argument for existential relativity 
concerns the term ‘fictionality’. Although the way he introduces the 
term at first suggests that there has to be an author of a fictional story on 
whose imagination the story and its characters ontologically depend (cf. 
p. 18), he later argues that there does not have to be an author because 
all the stories are yet already there in logical space and just have to be 
discovered by the mind: ‘there is one-one correspondence  ... between 
a fiction and a region of logical space.’ (p. 28) However, if, on the one 
hand, by ‘fictionality’ he means something like ‘participation in a region 
of Logical Space’ or ‘being depicted in some way by a region of Logical 
Space’ then it is unclear what the second premise actually asserts because 
in this case it looks like the negation of the ultimate conclusion of the 
argument: that existence is relative to a  region of Logical Space. That 
is to say, if something’s being fictional is equivalent to there being 
a logical region relative to which it exists, then the second premise of the 
argument is false: in this case fictionality would be a correct description 
of the situation at hand. But if, on the other hand, he deploys a notion 
of fictionality according to which fictionality is not an  alternative 
whatsoever to our existing, then he presupposes an  absolute notion 
of existence against which fictionality is rejected. That is, we obtain 
an obvious interpretation according to which the second premise is true if 
we assume that it implicitly presupposes an absolute notion of existence: 
the reason why fictionality is no alternative whatsoever to our existence 
is that we actually and absolutely exist while fictional characters do not.
Of course, the problems in respect to the justification of existential 
relativity do not entail that existential relativity and consequently logical 
pantheism itself are false. However, since the argument is either question 
begging or presupposes an absolute notion of existence itself, Aranyosi’s 
case for logical pantheism ultimately failed to convince me.
